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Wheelhouse

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THE LOOKOUT

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A Message From the Wheelhouse

Thanks for checking out Issue #10 of The Lookout, our annual newsletter covering wide ranging topics that are historical, technical, and relevant to our diving community in Massachusetts. This issue includes articles on the Human Factors in Diving two-day class, the wreck of the Coyote, and a recap of diving highlights. In addition, we have an update on our exploration projects, and some unfortunate news concerning the destruction of the wreck of the F/V North Star.


We'd like to thank all our customers and crew for your continued support and participation aboard Gauntlet. The 2018 diving season will be an exciting one. We hope that you'll join us on our adventures whether you are looking for training or just some great wreck diving off the coast of New England!

We hope you enjoy this issue of The Lookout!

Heather and Dave

Human Factors in Diving Two-Day Class Review

Major advances in sport diving technology with closed-circuit rebreathers (CCRs) and highly sophisticated dive computers have made dives once seen as impossible, if not impractical, now within the reach of most technical divers. This new reality allows divers to knowingly and unknowingly push the limits, and we must ask ourselves, are we fully prepared? Technical divers are utilizing complex, sophisticated equipment with numerous failure points where a minor error can have fatal consequences. Dives that are longer, deeper, and/or objective-based (e.g., mapping, data collection, photography, object recovery, etc.) are increasingly common. As a result, dive execution requirements are more involved and the dives are riskier, as they have the potential to create an environment where the ability to execute might go beyond the strengths and capability of any one individual and result in a greater dependency on the ability of a team to perform. Technical diving training curriculums largely focus on individual “technical skills,” such as diver ability, equipment, dive planning and gas contingencies. However, most curriculums do not address “non-technical skills,” that is, leadership, followership, communication and critical thinking. The Human Factors Skills in Diving program fills a critical gap in technical diving training as it relates to risk management of human error through improved situational awareness, decision making, and communication skills.



Preparing to execute a mission on the GemaSim system.

performance in individuals and teams. Gareth Lock, founder of Human in the System, has an impressive military aviation background and is an active technical diver. His interest in examining the role of human factors in scuba diving incidents led him to develop and launch a series of Human Factors Skills in Diving programs to improve the knowledge, skills and safety of all divers. These programs include an online micro-course, classroom based courses, and a new series of webinar courses focused on different aspects of leadership and technical diving. We arranged to bring Gareth Lock to the Boston area to conduct a two-day class in September 2017.


The online micro-class is the most common form of Human Factors training. It is an inexpensive 3-hour introduction to the concepts of human error and risk management in diving. While the lessons are highly relevant to technical divers, even recreational divers can benefit from the micro-class. The two-day class goes a step further exploring these concepts in greater detail, and utilizes GemaSim as the centerpiece of the curriculum. GemaSim is a computer-based simulation designed by psychologists to enhance teamwork and performance by creating a stressful, time-bound and challenging environment in which the only way to complete the mission in time is to operate coherently as a team with clear roles, unambiguous communication, effective leadership and followership, and robust decision making.

One of the fundamental premises of the Human Factors Skills in Diving course is that human error is unavoidable. It is how we prepare for and respond to errors that can make the difference between a

good outcome or a bad one. In technical diving, errors leading to diving accidents are sometimes subtle errors or oversights that snowball into an overwhelming problem in a harsh, unforgiving environment. The class includes several accident analysis exercises where it becomes clear that there is often not a single cause, but rather a constellation of behaviors, practices and decisions involved in how and why the accident occurred.

Situational Awareness:

Situational awareness is “the perception of environmental elements and events with respect to time or space, the comprehension of their meaning, and the projection of their status after some variable has changed, such as time, or some other variable, such as a predetermined event” (Wikipedia, 2017). In our class, Gareth created a scenario to demonstrate loss of situational awareness during a GemaSim mission when one team member unexpectedly became incapacitated without warning (Gareth whispered to the individual to pretend to be unconscious). Team members went on carrying out their tasks completely oblivious to the fact the incapacitated individual was unresponsive, despite a four-person team configuration with two members sitting opposite the other two members (i.e., two team members were facing the incapacitated person). It was only when the tasks were not being completed and the mission was going off track that the others realized there was a problem, struggled to understand what was going on and then scrambled to compensate. In this example, all team members were so focused on their own tasks that they had lost situational awareness to detect something had changed in the environment. In fact, no one had even considered the possibility a team member might be unable to complete his or her tasks.



Gareth Lock presenting on major concepts in the Human Factors in Diving class.




Each person in the 4-person team has a role. However, when one team member becomes incapacitated, the others have to multi-task and work together to compensate. Here, Dave is “unconscious.”

Reflecting on the question, “How do you know when situational awareness has been lost?” during a dive, we often realize this when something happens. Preventing loss of situational awareness is not entirely straight forward; however, being vigilant and aware that we are susceptible to losing situational awareness is a strong first step in mitigating that risk. It is knowing what to look for—knowing the diving environment,

leveraging your dive plan and pre-dive briefing, and knowing the roles and responsibilities of your team. In subsequent missions, the team responded quickly and purposefully at the first sign of a team member becoming unresponsive. So, to some degree, it is knowing what to look for and beyond that, what to do when it happens.

Decision Making:

Another concept central to the Human Factors Skills in diving training is decision making. We make hundreds of decisions every day and in most cases, they do not create peril. However, in diving, and other higher-risk activities, they can have profound impact. Herein lies the concept of “normalization of deviance,” the gradual process through which unacceptable practice or standards become acceptable. There are well known examples of normalization of deviance that have played out with disastrous consequences, such as the 1986 Challenger launch decision and subsequent explosion with the loss of the vehicle and all astronauts onboard. In diving, we see this in many forms ranging from divers without proper training and qualifications undertaking dives beyond their capability, to CCR divers carrying inadequate bailout gas volume or pushing scrubber capacity, to divers entering overhead environments without running a continuous guideline.



Gareth Lock explains decision making and the concept of normalization of deviance. The illustration shows how our behavior becomes more risky when nothing bad happens. Eventually, such behavior results in an accident.

The idea that our safety boundary can subtly move closer and closer to the accident boundary is concerning and difficult to manage because it is not always possible to know where that boundary is until one crosses it. Sometimes, a minor scare or a relatable accident causes us to re-evaluate our own behaviors and proactively reset that boundary. However, such occurrences are rare enough that it is possible for someone to be unaware he or she lacks the skill and knowledge to undertake certain dives. Unlike other sports, such as climbing, where lack of skill will stop someone from doing certain climbs, in diving an individual with time and money can quickly begin diving beyond their ability. Preventing normalization of deviance requires discipline, the willingness to be open to feedback from others and at times, being willing to call off a dive or modify it because things are not as they should be. Decision making must include consideration of the potential impacts of those decisions. It is also critical to recognize that we may be making decisions without sufficient knowledge and therefore, may be unaware we are making a poor decision. For example, in the first GemaSim mission, we delayed our launch after the mission clock had initiated in order to double check all systems and procedures not realizing we wasted precious time that would result in the mission's failure and being unable to return to home base. A seemingly well-intentioned decision ultimately had a disastrous result. Said another way, we don't know what we don't know.

Communication:

Communication is without a doubt the hardest of all skills to master. However, communication is core to mitigating human error, as it allows us to set and understand the roles, responsibilities and concerns of team members, develop a plan and brief all on the plan, as well as conduct an effective debrief following the activity. Teamwork, leadership and followership require effective communication in a high performing team. Understanding the interdependencies between situational awareness, decision making, communication and the team allows us to see this as a system with each part playing a critical role. A disruption to the function of any one of those parts, such as one caused by stress or fatigue, can affect the whole system.

Our experiences in the GemaSim missions and debriefs following completion of the missions demonstrated not only how the system functioned, but how stresses on the system can affect the performance of the team or individual. Each GemaSim mission lasted about 1.5 hours with the group debrief. While four team members participated in the GemaSim mission, three observers, including Gareth, took extensive notes on everything they observed. Following the mission each individual participant gave his or her feedback on what went well and what needed improvement both from an individual and team perspective. Similarly, the observers provided their perspectives as well. The debrief allowed each of us to better understand our strengths and weaknesses, how others perceived us, how we perceived the interactions, and ultimately what worked and what did not work.



Graduates of the Human Factors Skills in Diving two-day class.

In our fourth and final GemaSim mission, we were ready to demonstrate our learnings. The final mission was both time and objective based—score the highest number of points through completing as many tasks as possible within the least amount of mission time. Before starting the clock and initiating the launch sequence, we discussed our roles and responsibilities, ensuring we not only leveraged our strengths, but that everyone had a role he or she wanted (previous roles were assigned). Knowing that everyone was in the right role allowed us to have greater trust that each person could “own” his or her tasks. We spent little to no time questioning or inquiring about a recommendation or system status. Having a clear understanding of the objectives of the mission, we discussed and developed scenarios for when we would take certain decisions to ensure we met those objectives and if we could not, we appropriately prioritized our objectives. For example, we wanted to survive the mission! All of these efforts paid off, as we completed the mission with an excellent balance of high score relative to mission time.

Closing Thoughts:

Following the class, we received a series of four follow-up emails to help us reflect on what we learned and the progress we were making on our personal goals that we set during the class. This follow-up activity is beneficial because it allowed us to evaluate whether the outcome of the class

truly impacted our thinking and behaviors. The final email asked us to provide feedback on one thing that has changed since taking the class, which is a particularly powerful conclusion because it is measurable and real. The Human Factors in Diving class has great value because it not only gets at issues core to risks in technical diving and human error, but it helps us better understand ourselves. These learnings are relevant outside of diving and can apply to many other aspects of life and career. The class exceeded our expectations and we would highly recommend the course to anyone looking to improve their individual performance and safety in diving.


The Destruction of the Shipwreck F/V North Star

This summer, large commercial scallopers destroyed the wreck of the F/V North Star, a modern shipwreck within Stellwagen Bank National Marine Sanctuary (SBNMS). The loss of the F/V North Star not only has a financial impact to sport diving charter boats, but this unfortunate situation sends a strong message about the effectiveness of SBNMS's management strategy as it pertains to shipwrecks, commercial fishing vessels and divers. The policy of non-disclosure of historic wreck sites and limited disclosure of modern shipwreck sites (such as the North Star) may actually place shipwrecks in even greater jeopardy of damage or destruction than if the public had practical access to location information (e.g., AWOIS database update, accurate reporting of position on nautical charts).

The [F/V North Star](#) (ex. Bonaventure) was a wooden-hulled eastern rig dragger built by Royal K. Lowell of Portland, Maine in 1967. Based out of Gloucester and actively fishing in the SW Gulf of Maine, the 55-foot North Star sank on August 28, 2003 into 100 feet of water on Stellwagen Bank within SBNMS. As the North Star's crew lifted its clam dredge aboard, the vessel listed and capsized due to instability. The Coast Guard casualty report concluded that the weight of clams already onboard coupled with the weight of the clams in the dredge caused the vessel to roll over. Fortunately, there were no fatalities associated with the sinking, as the two crew members were rescued by the nearby vessel, Half Fast.

SBNMS later located the F/V North Star during remote sensing surveys. The wreck existed as a debris field with three concentrated areas of wreckage separated from one another. In 2012, SBNMS and NADE collaborated to develop an informational flyer to help both dive charter boats and private dive vessels access the site. The collaboration also included installation of a sub-sea mooring system funded by the PADI Foundation to facilitate low-impact access.

While SBNMS is a designated National Marine Sanctuary, Stellwagen's Management Plan has limitations due to certain federal laws and regulations. The most notable is the Magnuson-Stevens




Side scan sonar image showing scattered remains of the F/V North Star after impact from commercial scallop fishing vessels. Image credit: NOAA/SBNMS.

Fishery Conservation and Management Act, first passed in 1972, which is the primary law governing marine fisheries management in U.S. federal waters. Prior to the Magnuson-Stevens Act, waters beyond 12 nautical miles were international waters and fished by fleets from other countries. A revision to the law extended U.S. jurisdiction to 200 nautical miles and established eight regional fishery management councils. The Councils' primary responsibility is the development of fishery management plans that must comply with a number of conservation and management requirements. Importantly, the Magnuson-Stevens Act supersedes the Sanctuary's regulations and does not allow for regulation of fishing activities by any other authority other than the fishery management councils. Thus, despite all the restrictions placed on other user groups in SBNMS by way of the Management Plan and authority of NOAA, the ones applying to commercial fishing are only those recognized under the Magnuson-Stevens Act, and therefore, commercial fishing occurs within SBNMS. Several efforts over the years by SBNMS to change this have failed.



The F/V North Star was a “magnet” for marine life in an otherwise sand desert on Stellwagen Bank.

In the last few years, due to fisheries management decisions allowing for fleets to move into different areas, there has been highly concentrated scallop fishing activity within a small area on Stellwagen Bank that includes the North Star’s location, among other wrecks. In 2016, we observed damage to the wreck of the North Star. However, in 2017, following a survey conducted by SBNMS on the suspicion the North Star may have been impacted again, we learned the wreck had in fact been essentially destroyed.



The sub-sea mooring system has disappeared from the wreck site, most likely dragged off an unknown distance by a commercial scallop vessel.

SBNMS shared with NADE a side scan sonar survey image that showed a highly disarticulated wreck with only scattered bits remaining on the sea floor. The image resolution did not allow for visualization of several key features, including the mooring system, which was a 700-pound steel base with a chain suspended 12 feet off the bottom by a hard plastic float buoy. NADE had a scheduled charter to the North Star on July 12, 2017, so we had the opportunity to investigate the condition of the wreck ourselves. We put one team in the water to observe the site and locate the

mooring if possible so we could potentially recover it and move it to a different site.

The team entered the water and returned in approximately 10 minutes following a quick survey. Essentially there was nothing remaining except for the flattened foc'stle companionway and some scattered debris. Shockingly, the entire mooring system was gone. Whatever hung up into the mooring system had the power to drag it off to an unknown distance. Clearly, the already fragile wreck never stood a chance. Gauntlet moved to a different dive site and suspended scheduling any additional charters to the North Star.

During a follow-on Sanctuary Advisory Council (SAC) meeting, the SAC membership expressed significant concerns about the management approach to date that allowed such damage to occur by fishing. The SAC strongly agreed that SBNMS needs to “rethink” its management approach to shipwrecks, which is largely one of non-disclosure of shipwreck locations to limit access by divers while ignoring the impact by commercial fishing boats. Simply put, if there is to be any measure of protection afforded to shipwrecks within SBNMS, the location of the wreck must be known to commercial fisherman so that they can avoid the area. Any policy of disclosure must be fair and balanced and therefore a solution needs to be developed that both protects the wrecks to the extent possible without alienating a user group such as divers.

At the October 2017 council meeting, the SAC voted on and approved a motion to create a Maritime Heritage Working Group that will analyze the current situation and propose strategies to the SAC and SBNMS on how the policy of non-disclosure can be reconsidered. The new policy must strike a balance to ensure fisherman are aware of the locations to be avoided, as well as consider divers and their access to information, while still protecting the integrity of historic shipwrecks. It is unfortunate that the perception of divers as “looters” still exists and remains a significant concern in general, but the practice of concealing the locations to protect shipwrecks from divers is not only illogical in the context of the Magnuson-Stevens Act, but it alienates an important constituency (diving) that is largely conservation minded. The membership of the Working Group will be composed of NOAA and SBNMS staff, SAC members, Commonwealth of Massachusetts representatives from the Historical Society and Board of Underwater Archaeological Resources, along with archaeologists, and divers. We will share additional information as the Working Group forms and tackles this issue.

Needless to say, it is terribly unfortunate that large commercial scallop vessels destroyed the wreck of the North Star. The loss of the North Star has a clear economic impact to commercial dive charter boats. There are not many shallow shipwrecks within SBNMS that have enough wreckage present to entice divers to visit the site. While it is unlikely significant changes to SBNMS management policy can or will occur that will address the issue of destructive forms of commercial fishing, we commend the Sanctuary for acknowledging the problem and being open to finding solutions.



Scallop beds, including the “flying” seed scallops, were plentiful around the wreck of the North Star with abundant marine life calling the wreck home. It was not unusual to see several wolffish on a single dive.

Wreck Profile: Coyote

The [Coyote](#) is among the best technical wreck dives in Massachusetts Bay—though it varies from a spectacular swim around one of Massachusetts Bay's largest wrecks to a “deep, dark and scary” adventure when the visibility is low and entanglement hazards are greatest. Like many vessels sunk in the Boston Dumping Grounds, the Coyote's life before finally finding its way to the bottom of the ocean on January 11, 1932 is an interesting story worthy of recounting.

The story of the Coyote began in 1918 when the Emergency Fleet Corporation, owned by the United States Shipping Board, purchased the Coyote to join the fleet of vessels transporting supplies and war materials to Europe during World War 1. Steamships like the Coyote, commonly referred to as “bottoms,” weren't of the highest quality, as they were poorly constructed and made out of low quality wood due to the scarcity of other materials, such as iron. German U-boats and mines sank the “bottoms” as fast as they could build them; however, many of the vessels did not even see service as the war ended before completion of construction. The Coyote became one of those vessels.

In order to recoup cost after the war, the government attempted to sell these vessels despite having little market for them. The “bottoms” were slow, handled poorly and often had structural issues due

to the quality of the wood. The hulls leaked and the wood easily rotted. Some vessels found service in the merchant trades, but they sold for cheap—often less than the cost of construction. Salvagers burned others to strip out metal that could be sold for scrap.



The Coyote, derelict and abandoned along side a pier. Photo: Boston Public Library.



The Coyote burning after floating off the beach. Photo: Boston Public Library.


The Foundation Company of Newark, NJ constructed the Coyote's hull, which went on to Lord Construction Company in Providence, RI for installation of the triple expansion steam engine. Lord Construction installed the iconic water tube boilers made by Traylor Engineering and Manufacturing

Company that are still present on the wreck today. The finished wood-hulled Coyote measured 267 feet in length, by 46 feet wide with a draft of 26 feet, with a gross tonnage of 2551 ton.

The Coyote began service on July 22, 1918, with the purpose of carrying cargo in coastwise trade; however, after striking a rock off New Bedford, CT, the Coyote suffered a mortal wound that ultimately led to its demise. Flooding with water from a gash in the hull, tugs towed the Coyote to a beach where the vessel underwent repairs so that it could be refloated and towed to Chelsea, MA. There, the US Marshal declared the Coyote unfit for use and to be sold to settle salvage claims.

While at the dock in Chelsea, salvagers stripped the Coyote of remaining cargo and anything of value. The Coyote sank again, but salvagers raised it and planned for it to be beached where the vessel would be burned for metal. By 1924 the Coyote sat beached on Apple Island in Boston; however, a high tide refloated the Coyote and the vessel escaped, grounding off Smoke Island. There had been an unsuccessful attempt to burn the vessel as well around this time. Ultimately, tugs moved the Coyote back to Apple Island and beached the decrepit vessel where it sat for the next 8 years.

Finally, in 1932, the Coyote once again underwent repairs so it could be towed out to sea, burned and sunk. On January 11, 1932, two tugs hauled the Coyote off the beach so the vessel could be scuttled once and for all. Pumps labored to keep the Coyote afloat. Once the Coyote arrived at its disposal location, a blast of dynamite opened up the hull and sent the old vessel to the bottom. Interestingly, unlike many other depression-era vessels scuttled off Boston that were stripped for absolutely anything of value, a few pieces of machinery remained in the Coyote in order to keep the vessel sunken. The two trapezoidal water tube boilers, crankshaft and propeller remained in the vessel. The Coyote sank at 3:40 pm.



Putting some scale to the massive propeller on the wreck of the Coyote.



The iconic trapezoidal water tube boilers on the wreck of the Coyote.

Today, the Coyote rests in 170 feet of water off Boston. The intact hull rises approximately 15 feet from the seafloor. It is possible to get a little bit deeper inside the hull since the hull has settled into the seafloor. The washout around the stern allows the propeller to be fully visible. The crankshaft, water tanks and water tube boilers are all easily visited on a dive. The brick furnaces are also visible near the boilers. Given the intact nature of the hull, it is possible to “swim through” some sections where beams and remaining deck planking cover over the hull. However, diving the Coyote requires extreme caution given the amount of entanglement hazard present on the wreck. There is an incredible amount of monofilament, gill net and other floating derelict fishing gear present on the wreck, and it is difficult to see. Like many of the Boston Dumping Ground dives sites, visibility is highly variable. In low visibility, it is difficult to see derelict fishing gear that might be overhead or off to the side, just out of view.


For the experienced technical diver, the Coyote offers an excellent dive for scootering, photography or simply exploration and enjoyment of a great New England shipwreck—as long as you catch the right day!

Diving Highlights

The 2017 diving season brought with it some great adventures in Massachusetts Bay and Stellwagen Bank National Marine Sanctuary! Highlights included some fantastic visibility on the wreck of the Pinthis and outstanding marine life on the wreck of the Patriot.

Patriot:

The [Patriot](#) never disappoints in what it has to offer for outstanding marine life experiences. This year, while we did not get buzzed by any whales as we hoped (the bar has gotten high), we did see numerous “resident” goosefish on the wreck. On one dive, we counted 7 goosefish! We actually started to lose count! Bottom conditions were excellent, although we had some trips with very sloppy surface conditions.



Each year the Patriot seems to have a different environment and make-up of marine life. 2017 was the year of the Goosefish.

Favorite Dives:

Gauntlet only made a few trips to the [Pinthis](#) this summer, but they were good ones! On our first trip the visibility exceeded 30 feet revealing even more collapse. In a few years expect to see dramatic changes and collapse. The stern is quickly collapsing, with sagging deck plates revealing machinery and components previously tucked within the hull.

Gauntlet also made several trips to the [Snetind](#), one of our favorites. In [Issue 9](#) of The Lookout, we wrote about the story of the Snetind. Check it out if you have not yet read it. Low visibility hampered several of the dives on the Snetind, but we did finally catch one day with excellent visibility of

approximately 25 feet with plenty of ambient light. It is so much easier to navigate this large wreck with good visibility.

The YF-415 Story Continues:

In our 2013 newsletter ([Issue 6](#)), we wrote about the sinking of the [USS YF-415](#) from the perspective of sailors aboard the USS Zircon. A family member performing online research contacted us after discovering the story of the USS YF-415. We interviewed two sailors that served aboard the USS Zircon, participating in the rescue of sailors on the USS YF-415 after it exploded on May 11, 1944.

Isidore "Teddy" Bertone and

Anthony Sussino shared their stories with us, recalling the events as if they occurred yesterday. Unfortunately, Anthony Sussino passed away in 2016; however, the newsletter article led to making

another contact with Patrick Power of California. Patrick's late father John Power served aboard the USS Zircon, rescuing as many as 14 men and receiving a commendation for his bravery and heroic actions that day. In early October, Bob Foster, David Caldwell and Heather Knowles met with Patrick Power to learn more and collaborate on future research.

Patrick Power is continuing research into both the USS YF-415 and USS Zircon, focusing on finding any remaining living sailors or their family members who served on the USS Zircon. We will share more as it unfolds!



Swimming back from the bow of the Snetind. Most of the dives had low visibility, but we lucked out on one trip with a solid 25 feet.



Patrick Power with Isidore "Teddy" Bertone. Photo courtesy of Patrick Power.

Exploration Report

NADE continued to explore the unidentified steamship the team first dived as part of our Memorandum of Agreement with NOAA in 2016. Depth, the condition of the wreck and weather conditions are a constant challenge in exploring this site; however, the team has made considerable

progress in spite of those challenges. NADE plans to continue exploring the site into 2018 and beyond. We hope to share more information about the discovery and identification of this historic wreck in the future.

Notably, the Explorers Club awarded Explorers Club Flag 210 to David Caldwell, FN'11 and Heather Knowles, FN'11 in recognition of the project. This honor carries significance within the Explorers Club as a symbol of engaging in scientific exploration, and raises the profile of the project.



The SAS_11 Exploration Team with Explorers Club Flag 210.

News and Updates



Gauntlet docked in a temporary slip for the winter at the commercial docks of Glover Wharf Marina.

are not sure how long this project will run, it is expected to be complete before the late spring. We are pleased that we are able to keep the boat in the water this winter. When charters resume in March, we may still be in this location. We will provide more information at the time on how to access the boat.

During the winter of 2017-2018, major renovations are happening at Glover Wharf Marina. As many frequent Gauntlet divers know, too much movement of the docks from wind and tide causes a ramp bridging sections of dock to fall, resulting in a problematic gap between dock sections. The marina is finally addressing this with a permanent fix. The marina will have pilings installed which will better anchor the docks and prevent too much movement. The downside is that all boats needed to be removed from the recreational side of the marina for the winter. Fortunately, the marina accommodated us and found a spot for the Gauntlet on the commercial side. While we